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HISTORY & POLITICS 
 
John J. Horton 
 
Current international perceptions of Iceland are of a country spectacularly (though in no way 
uniquely) incapable of managing its financial affairs, and of one equally spectacularly (though in no 
way culpably) capable of disrupting air traffic across half of the world. It remains to be seen whether 
these perceptions eventually fade into and merge with the abundance of other (mis-)conceptions about 
Iceland. Hitherto the general hazy picture has been of a barren and icy landscape, an ancient form of 
literature known as the ‘saga’, and an involvement in ‘cod wars’. Too often, these facets of Iceland 
and its people have been studied in isolation: the geographical fieldworker has only occasionally 
paused to consider how this elemental landscape has bred and moulded the character and activity of 
those who live in it; the literary student rarely follows through from the old to the modern period of 
Icelandic literature; and those who have had their attention drawn towards Iceland for the first time by 
the international implications of its fisheries or security policy have reacted or reported with a 
frequent lack of awareness of those traditions—cultural, social, political and economic—that so 
clearly help towards explaining Icelandic attitudes. It is difficult to think of another country where 
geography, culture and contemporary affairs are so closely interrelated, and where the key to 
understanding it requires a triple engagement of the old, the new and the constant. 
That Iceland should exist at all as a modern independent nation state is remarkable in itself. 
Inhospitably located at the north-western extreme of Europe astride the mid-Atlantic ridge, it has 
sustained for over 1,100 years an alternately resolute and vibrant society against all the odds. Today it 
exhibits in microcosm most of the features of a developed European country, except for its own army 
and a railway network (neither of which it currently requires); and yet the development of its 
elemental resources is still to be fully exploited. To categorize Iceland as either developed or 
underdeveloped is unhelpful. Internationally, it has created an impact out of all proportion to its size: 
its total population was 326,340 at 31 March 2014, according to Statistics Iceland (Hagstofa 
Íslands)—an increase of 1.37% on the previous 15 months—with immigrants (those born outside 
Iceland) numbering 23,000 (the main category being immigrants from Poland). Net migration of 
Icelandic citizens in this period was -200. Nearly two-thirds of the population live in the capital, 
Reykjavík, and its neighbouring municipalities on the south-west peninsula. Iceland’s population, 
therefore, is no more than that of an average British city, on a land mass roughly equivalent in area to 
that of the island of Ireland; on several fronts (notwithstanding recent financial aberrations) its 
conduct and achievements have been a model for small-state diplomacy. 
The permanent settlement of Iceland began in 874, although there is clear evidence of a Celtic 
presence pre-dating the Viking settlement by perhaps three-quarters of a century (researches in the 
last few years based on carbon data may indicate a presence up to 200 years earlier); these Christian 
Celts appear to have left when confronted with the arrival of the heathen Norsemen, but further Celts 
came to Iceland together with the Norse settlers, evidence of which can be confirmed by observations 
of aspects of the physical anthropology and national character of today’s Icelanders when compared 
with continental Scandinavians. The settlement of Iceland was a process that took nearly 60 years; 
both the exact provenance and the total number of the settlers are matters of some debate, but a figure 
of over 25,000, with a significant proportion from Norway, could be reasonably suggested from 
approximately contemporary evidence. There are two features of significance for the subsequent 
development of the Icelanders that stem from the nature of this original settlement. The first is that, 
although the settlement took place at a time when Viking expansion was at its height, it was political 
force in Norway and the class of people affected that gave the settlement its initial impetus and 
particular character: for this was an exodus not of refugees belonging to a politically downtrodden 
class, but of noblemen with their retinues and followers, fired by a fierce spirit of independence rather 
than resigned to an inevitable exile; a significant degree of sophistication, both political and artistic, 
was therefore inherent from the start of the Icelandic settlement. The second important factor 
concerning the nature of the settlement of Iceland is that the land contained no indigenous population; 
there were, therefore, none of the problems, then or since, associated with relationships between 
colonists and colonized. These two factors have been underestimated in their relevance to the 
remarkable degree of cultural awareness and social cohesion that characterizes contemporary Iceland. 
By 930 the Old Icelandic Commonwealth became fully established with the foundation of the Alþingi 
(Althingi), or national parliament. Iceland was the last country in Europe to be settled, but the first to 
adopt a representative parliamentary system. Although it acted more as a safety valve than as a 
political regulator, the system was a fundamental element in both the rise of the Commonwealth and 
its eventual fall. Uniquely, it managed to solve by political means a religious question of the greatest 
magnitude—the adoption of Christianity in the year 1000. (Shortly before this the Viking spirit of 
adventure had been rekindled and, between 982 and 1000, resulted in an Icelandic colonization of 
Greenland and the discovery of the North American continent.) 
It was the conversion to Christianity that laid the foundations for the greatest achievement of the 
Commonwealth period. The 11th century was a time of relative peace and stability, in which the 
Icelandic bishops exerted great influence upon the intellectual development of the new nation: 
religious writings from abroad were translated, and the seeds of an Icelandic vernacular literature 
were thus sown. One outcome of this was the remarkable flowering of Icelandic writing in the 12th 
and 13th centuries—an isolated beacon of cultural achievement at a time of comparative darkness in 
continental Europe—in forms such as a vernacular history by the meticulous Ari, the literary genius 
and historical acumen of Snorri and the splendid ‘sagas of Icelanders’; these sagas, although they 
cannot be said to have affected the European literary tradition (hardly surprising in view of their 
isolation), themselves owed virtually nothing to external influences, which serves only to emphasize 
their unique character. However, their own influence upon many Icelandic writers of the modern 
period has been both subtle and profound. Poetry, too, flourished during the early centuries, in two 
major forms: the mythical-heroic poems of the Edda owe more to the continental tradition, but their 
themes are magnificently enhanced by the poets; and whereas the personal and commemorative 
expression of the skaldic poets can never reach a foreign audience as directly as can the sagas, 
because of their intensely intricate structure and wordplay, it is these very qualities that imply much 
about the intellectual facility of this class of people and their audience. 
In several ways the Old Icelandic Commonwealth contained the seeds of its own destruction. The Age 
of the Sturlungs (1230–64), named after the most powerful of the Icelandic families at that time, saw 
the Commonwealth complete a fateful transition from a form of democracy into an outright oligarchy, 
which, in turn, bred civil strife as local chieftains sought to extend their power and influence beyond 
their own localities, and violently to flout the traditional relationships between themselves and their 
farming freeholders. Assistance was sought and was readily forthcoming from Norway, where the 
King had already gained the support of the church in Iceland. The ‘Golden Age’ of Iceland and its 
Commonwealth ended in 1262–64, when Iceland was brought under the Norwegian Crown. 
In the following century, during which the authority of the Norwegian-manipulated church increased, 
Iceland was struck by a series of volcanic disasters followed by famine and disease; the outbreak of 
the Black Death in Norway severely affected the levels of Icelandic trade. In 1380 Iceland, together 
with Norway, came under Danish rule, as it was to remain over the next 500 years, for the most part 
of which the Icelanders battled against overwhelming odds imposed by natural disasters and foreign 
oppression. The effect of the Black Death, which reached Iceland in the first years of the 15th century 
and reduced the population by approximately one-third, was long-lasting, and an already shattered 
economy was subjected to trading disputes between Denmark, England and the German Hanseatic 
League. 
The 16th century was dominated by the politics of religion. The Lutheran cause at first infiltrated and 
later overtly imposed itself on Iceland amid increasing bitterness and eventual violence, culminating 
in the murder of the last Roman Catholic bishop of Iceland in 1550. (Iceland today is around 75% 
Lutheran (245,000 nominal registrations).Although in 2009–10, following revelations concerning 
sexual offences, the Lutheran Church lost by deregistration several thousand of its members, some of 
these to independent churches; the election and ordination of the first female Bishop of Iceland, 
Agnes M. Sigurđardóttir, in 2012 may have helped restore some confidence in the Church.) The 
Reformation thus began, and with it the two darkest centuries in Icelandic history, during which the 
country was subjected to further climatic deterioration, volcanic activity and epidemics, to foreign 
piracy and to total domination by Denmark on two fronts: economic, through the imposition of a 
foreign trade monopoly in 1602; and political, through the declaration of absolute monarchy over 
Iceland by Frederick III in 1662. Yet, in spite of all this, the 16th and 17th centuries in Iceland were 
notable for a spiritual, intellectual and literary creativity that seemed to grow out of adversity. 
During the 18th century there was some improvement on the economic front, chiefly as a result of the 
efforts of Skúli Magnússon, the first Icelander to hold the office of tax collector, who chipped away at 
the practices of the Danish Trading Company to such effect that in 1787 the Danish trade monopoly 
was removed. Once again, however, natural and political factors intervened to delay any more broadly 
based progress: a massive eruption of the Laki volcano in 1783–84 devastated most of the country; 
shortly afterwards the continuity of Iceland’s religious and political institutions was severed by a 
reorganization of the bishoprics and by the abolition of the Althingi. 
It was not until the 19th century that Iceland, for the first time, became significantly affected by 
events on the European continent. The economic disintegration of Denmark as a result of the 
Napoleonic wars was inevitably reflected in Iceland. However, it was the rise of European movements 
that was most deeply to affect the development of the Icelandic nation during that century. Iceland 
had been only superficially affected by the earlier ideas of the Enlightenment; yet the romantic and 
nationalist movements were to dominate the course of Icelandic history, the former reawakening the 
passion of the Icelanders for their literary heritage, the latter firing the thrust towards a national 
autonomy. A parallel movement for the preservation and purification of the Icelandic language added 
another strand to the patriotic and nationalist cause. The literary renaissance was personified by a 
number of 19th-century Icelandic writers, but the political advances were due chiefly to the efforts of 
one man, Iceland’s national hero, Jón Sigurðsson. Three major advances were achieved during the 
middle of the 19th century: in 1843 the Althingi was reconstituted; in 1854 trade restrictions with the 
rest of the world were lifted; and in 1874 (the millennium of the original settlement) a Constitution 
was granted that bestowed legislative, though not executive, powers upon the Althingi, and gave 
Iceland control over its own finances. Although these developments represented a major and, in 
retrospect, unstoppable advance towards long-term independence, a general dissatisfaction with the 
slow pace of political change and economic progress, coupled with continuing climatic problems, led 
to large-scale emigration of Icelanders to the North American continent during the last 30 years of the 
century. 
However, the momentum towards independence was maintained through the birth of the co-operative 
movement in 1882, the establishment of the National Bank in 1885, the inauguration of the University 
of Iceland in 1911 and the achievement of female suffrage in 1915. Iceland gained home rule in 1904 
and, following a referendum held in 1918, became an independent sovereign state in personal union 
with Denmark; Iceland was to share the Danish King and entrust to Denmark only matters of national 
security and foreign relations. This Act of Union was to be reviewed at the end of 1940, at which time 
either party could seek a revision; if no agreement were possible within a further three years, either 
country could unilaterally abrogate the Union. 
On 9 April 1940 German forces occupied Denmark. From that moment Denmark was in no position 
to conduct the foreign affairs of Iceland, and on the following day the Althingi resolved to exercise 
the powers hitherto assigned to the Danish King by the Constitution. In the following year the 
Althingi gave notice of its intention to sever the Union, and in May 1944 the issue was put to a 
referendum; the participation rate was 98.6%, of which 97.4% voted for abolition of the Act of Union 
and 95.0% for the new republican Constitution. The Republic of Iceland was born at Þingvellir (the 
site of the original Althingi) on 17 June 1944 (the birthday of Jón Sigurðsson). 
If the war years brought Iceland’s political development to a climax, they also transformed the 
country’s economic situation. Iceland was catapulted into the 20th century and the international arena. 
The British and, one year later, the USA’s occupying presence in Iceland during the Second World 
War resulted in the construction of two airfields that were to revolutionize Iceland’s communications 
with the outside world. Likewise, the amount of money brought into Iceland with the US base, 
although not huge in absolute terms, none the less acted as a catalyst on the employment opportunities 
and standard of living in a small-scale economy, and provided a starting point for the post-war 
development of Iceland. 
Iceland Today 
This sudden meeting with the outside world brought to Iceland the problems, as well as the benefits, 
of supranational politics and economics: the wartime military base became a North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) base, prompting arguments over international commitments and neutrality. A 
small-scale economy is vulnerable not only to global inflation, from which Iceland, in European 
terms, suffered badly until the late 1980s, but also to specific sectoral trends. Attempts to diversify the 
economy have been partly successful, particularly in the field of geothermal and hydroelectric energy, 
but Iceland’s economy remains largely dependent upon fish, and for the foreseeable future it is with 
fish that Iceland’s prosperity or otherwise will lie. It is against this background that Iceland’s stance in 
successive disputes with the United Kingdom and, more recently, Norway and Denmark over fishing 
rights and territorial waters must be understood. What is remarkable is the way in which Iceland, in so 
short a time, and without any period of transition, has adapted itself to a successful international 
profile. The deeper reasons for this are to be explained only by reference to the many strands that have 
historically shaped the Icelandic national character. 
Iceland has one of the highest life expectancies in the world, and the lowest infant mortality rate in 
Europe; moreover, the country has one of the highest and most evenly distributed standards of living 
in Europe. According to Statistics Iceland’s index of poverty and social exclusion risk, based on 
median salary figures, etc., Iceland (notwithstanding  the financial turmoil of recent years) currently 
has the lowest risk rating- 12.7%- in Europe, around half the rate for EU countries overall. Politically, 
Iceland has remained comparatively stable in spite of, or perhaps because of, coalition politics; social 
class differences are observably less pronounced than in other Western societies; gender equality 
performance placed Iceland top of the international table (as measured by the World Economic Forum 
in 2010), and in 2013 Iceland was named as the most peaceful country in the world by the Global 
Peace Index, which takes into account factors such as proportionately low expenditure on defence, 
low rates of murder, etc. The population is 100% literate, and 95% of Icelandic households are 
connected to the internet. According to the Times Higher Educational Supplement’s prestigious 
annual ranking of the top 300 universities in the world, the University of Iceland is more than holding 
its own at 250=. in 2014. In the field of international sport Iceland came agonisingly close to 
becoming the smallest nation ever to qualify for the finals of football’s World Cup, held in Brazil in 
summer 2014. 
Yet for more than a millennium, the very survival of the Icelandic nation was threatened either by 
natural or economic disasters. Survival in Iceland has become a fine art, in which sophistication has 
been added to fortitude. Today it is not the nation, but rather the national identity that is seen by some 
to be under threat. Of all the international pressures to which Iceland has been exposed since the 
Second World War, the most subtle has been that of cultural intrusion. However, the Icelanders’ 
perception of their own cultural tradition remains firmly rooted throughout a changing but still 
homogeneous society, which, in spite of urbanizing factors, will continue to be dominated by its 
natural environment: in November 1996 an eruption of the volcano underneath Europe’s largest ice 
cap, Vatnajökull, sent unstoppable floods of melting ice across the outwash plains, destroying power 
lines, bridges and the main coastal road linking Reykjavík with south-east Iceland; in May 2008 an 
earthquake measuring 6.2 on the Richter scale centred around Selfoss in the south-west was also felt 
at Ísafjörður in the north-west; in April 2010 an eruption of the volcano under Eyjafjallajökull, in the 
shadow of the historically notorious larger volcano Katla, created clouds of volcanic ash that 
paralysed air travel across large parts of Europe; and this was followed by the much more violent, 
though less disruptive, eruption of Grímsvötn in 2011. Remarkably, none of these events caused loss 
of human life. UNESCO has placed the island of Surtsey, created by volcanic activity in 1964, on its 
official list of World Heritage sites. 
Perhaps the most cohesive defence of the nation’s culture lies in the Icelandic language. The equation 
of language and race is a concept often challenged by anthropologists and historians, but in the case of 
Iceland it is undeniable. The Icelandic language has changed comparatively little from the Norse 
standard of Viking times. Linguistically, as well as in literature, there remains a strong bond between 
the modern era and the ‘Golden Age’. The language, by geographical accident and, latterly, by 
conscious design, has remained relatively free from foreign influences. It is spoken only by the 
Icelandic nation; within Iceland its character is uniform; it is what most obviously distinguishes the 
Icelanders from other peoples, and it is the constant living reminder of their origin, culture and 
national identity. 
Political Development 
The 1944 Constitution of the Republic of Iceland provides for a president as the head of state. The 
post is filled by direct election with no overt political party candidature. Executive power is notionally 
vested in the presidency, but in practice its function is a mixture of celebrational, representational and 
advisory. There have been five Presidents since the formation of the Republic. In 1980 Vigdís 
Finnbogadóttir became the country’s fourth President and the first woman in the world to be 
democratically elected as a head of state. Her popularity abroad and at home was reflected in her 
serving for four terms of office, for the second and fourth of which she was elected unopposed. She 
retired in 1996 and was succeeded in the subsequent election, one in which the political association of 
the candidates became an unofficial feature, by Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, a political scientist and 
former Minister of Finance, who had previously led the left-wing People’s Alliance (PA—
Alþýðubandalagið). He was elected with 41% of the total votes cast in a field of four candidates (a 
further candidate withdrew in protest at the politicization of the process). In July 2000, at the end of 
his constitutional term of four years in office, no other candidates presented themselves for election 
and, consequently, Grímsson was installed as President for a further four years. In March 2004 he 
announced his intention to stand for a third term, and on 26 June he was re-elected with 85.6% of the 
votes cast. 
Subsequently, Grímsson was the subject of some controversy relating to the scope of his role. In June 
2008 his term was extended by a further four years, again no other candidates having presented 
themselves for election. Despite using his presidential veto on several occasions in relation to the 
banking crisis and the Icesave question, plus his unprecedented (although constitutional) use of public 
referendums on motions passed by the Althingi, in March 2012 Grímsson—having previously 
indicated that he would not stand again—was buoyed by a supporting petition of 30,000 citizens and 
announced his decision to present himself for a fifth term of office. The presidential election was duly 
held on 30 June, this time involving five other candidates, who included a geological 
environmentalist, a social and environmental activist, a professor of law and human rights 
campaigner, and a business consultant. The main opponent to Grímsson to emerge, however, was 
Thóra (Þóra) Arnórsdóttir, a journalist and popular television presenter aged only 37, whose campaign 
coincided with the birth of her third child and was based on a promise to return the presidency to its 
more traditionally ceremonial role. In the event, Arnórsdóttir secured a more than respectable 33.2% 
of the total vote, against the 52.8% won by the incumbent President, who was therefore elected for a 
further four years. 
The Althingi has been a single chamber since 1991 and comprises 63 members elected by 
proportional representation. There is universal suffrage above the age of 18 years. Since independence 
Iceland has always been governed by coalitions, as no single party has secured an overall majority at 
any of the general elections, which are normally held every four years. The main political parties 
were, traditionally, the Independence Party (IP—Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn; centre-right), the Progressive 
Party (PP—Framsóknarflokkurinn; agrarian and co-operative based), the Social Democratic Party 
(SDP—Alþýðuflokkurinn; centre-left) and the leftist PA. The SDP and the PA merged with two 
smaller left-wing parties in 1999 to form the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA—Samfylkingin). 
Other significant parties have emerged over the last two decades, notably (though recently without 
parliamentary representation) the free market Liberal Party (Frjálslyndi flokkurinn), established by a 
former IP member, Sverrir Hermannsson, and the Left-Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin—grænt 
framboð), originally formed by three dissident members of the PA, the latter of these parties having 
subsequently developed into a strong political force. The Movement (Hreyfingin), a radical grass-
roots party, was formed in 2009 as a response to the economic crisis, and had three members of the 
Althingi until 2013.<!--didnt get seats in the 2013 elections - have asked the author to clarify as there 
are also other new parties-->  
The IP dominated the political scene from the 1990s until the late 2000s. At the general election held 
on 12 May 2007, the turnout of 83.6% of the electorate was some 4% lower than that for the election 
of 2003. The voting resulted in the narrowest possible majority for the governing coalition of the IP 
and PP, headed by Geir Haarde, the Chairman of the IP and Prime Minister since June 2006. The IP 
won 25 seats in the Althingi, three more than in the previous legislature, while the PP won seven seats 
(five fewer than previously), giving the coalition a total of 32 of the 63 seats. The SDA won 18 seats 
(a loss of two) and the Left-Green Movement nine seats (a gain of four). The largest gains were, 
therefore, made by the Left-Green Movement, under the widely popular leadership of Steingrímur 
Sigfússon; the main loser was the PP, whose leader, Jón Sigurðsson, failed to win his seat in the 
Althingi. As the combined opposition was one seat short of being able to form a majority government, 
the IP was in a position to decide whether to remain in power precariously, with the support of a badly 
wounded partner, or to seek a new coalition with the relatively unscathed SDA. After five days of 
intense political activity it was decided to end the coalition that had led the country for the previous 
12 years, and to approach the Pres-ident for a mandate for the IP to form a new majority coalition 
with the SDA, the largest of the opposition parties. Sigurðsson resigned as leader of the PP and was 
replaced by the former Minister of Industry, Guðni Ágústsson. The new Government took office at 
the end of May 2007, with Haarde remaining Prime Minister and Ingibjörg Solrún Gísladóttir of the 
SDA becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
In the six months following the election, the new coalition Government functioned relatively 
smoothly and enjoyed a further surge in public support. During 2008, however, tensions began to 
surface between the two partners with regard to environmental and foreign policy issues: notably, on 
new legislation relating to water resource rights and their potential to allow the growth of heavier 
industry with environmental consequences, and on the question of whether to cancel Iceland’s current 
exemption from the Kyoto Protocol in respect of greenhouse gases, whereby Iceland is allowed a 
small increase in emissions, compared with the overall reduction required of members of the EU. The 
IP was also compromised by controversy surrounding the control of the Reykjavík municipal council 
and experienced a decline in support for itself and its leader, while that of the SDA rose by several 
percentage points. Furthermore, popular support for the Government as a whole declined significantly 
during 2008, mainly as a result of major problems with the state of the economy. 
These problems dramatically intensified in October 2008 when the banking system in Iceland 
collapsed into liquidation, dragging the economy and the currency into deep recession. After a further 
three months of the crisis and the resulting decline in both the credibility and the popularity of the IP, 
the Prime Minister and the Government bowed to pressure and resigned on 26 January 2009––Haarde 
having also announced three days earlier his resignation as Chairman of the IP following a diagnosis 
of oesophageal cancer. On 1 February a new interim Government was formed from a coalition of the 
SDA and the Left-Green Movement. The general level of support for the SDA had not been 
significantly affected by its participation in the previous Government, as it had not had prime 
responsibility for the financial portfolio, while the Left-Green Movement was entering government 
for the first time. Having for some months been prevented from exercising her leadership of the SDA, 
owing to serious illness, Gísladóttir, whose position might have been less sustainable as part of the 
failed Government, resigned and was succeeded unopposed by the widely popular Jóhanna 
Sigurðardóttir, who also became Prime Minister of the new coalition Government (and thereby the 
world’s first openly gay national leader), with Steingrímur Sigfússon, leader of the Left-Green 
Movement, taking the crucial role of Minister of Finance, Fisheries and Agriculture. The full Cabinet 
of 10 ministers comprised five men and five women. The policy of the new minority Government was 
set out in a joint declaration under seven headings: increasing demo-cracy, rebuilding the economy, 
restructuring the administration, introducing measures favouring households, promoting business, 
rebuilding the financial system and its institutions, and focusing on international agreements 
(particularly with the EU). The two parties also agreed on the necessity for an early general election 
(the next one was constitutionally due by 2011) and set the date as 25 April 2009. 
In the weeks before the election the major parties were distracted by internal difficulties. The IP, 
which elected its new Chairman, Bjarni Benediktsson, at its conference in March 2009, was divided 
on two fronts: the question of membership of the EU and the reaction to the intervention of Davið 
Oddson, a former Prime Minister and leader of the IP. Oddson, who had refused to resign as 
Chairman of the Central Bank, was forced out of office in February by legislation adopted by the 
Althingi. Oddsson denied the IP’s responsibility for the country’s financial collapse and opposed the 
more ‘apologetic’ approach favoured generally by the party. The PP also changed its Chairman (for 
the fifth time in three years) in January. The position was taken by a young leader, Sigmundur Davið 
Gunnlaugsson, who controversially agreed to vote with the minority Government in the event of a 
motion of no confidence. The SDA had for some time occasionally revealed tensions between its left-
wing elements and those more committed to the European social democratic profile, in terms of 
favouring responsible business enterprise and moves towards membership of the EU. Its coalition 
partner, the Left-Green Movement, was meanwhile trying to decide which of its two main planks, 
socially-based economics or the environmental agenda, should form its major focus in the short term. 
At the general election held on 25 April 2009 the turnout reached 85.1%, higher than the election of 
2007, but still below Iceland’s historical average of just over 90%. The SDA/Left-Green Movement 
coalition won 34 of the 63 seats in the Althingi, thereby being transformed into a majority 
government. The SDA won 29.8% of the votes, an increase of 3% compared with the previous 
election, and took 20 seats, while the Left-Green Movement won 21.7% of the votes, an increase of 
7.4%, and took 14 seats. The IP’s support declined significantly: it won 23.7% of the votes cast (down 
9%) and only 16 seats, compared with 25 at the previous election. The PP, although well below its 
historical best, could take some comfort from its showing; it won nine seats, compared with seven in 
the previous election. At its first election the Citizens’ Movement (Borgarahreyfingin) won four seats, 
while the Liberal Party failed to gain representation in the Althingi. 
Following the election, the new Government increased the size of the Cabinet from 10 to 12 members, 
eight of whom had served in the minority Government. The new line-up of ministers comprised five 
from each of the two parties, and two without party affiliation. The immediate task of the two parties 
revolved around their differences on policies, most notably the question of European Union (EU) 
membership, favoured by the SDA but opposed by the Left-Green Movement. Within a fortnight they 
had reached a form of compromise whereby the Althingi as a whole would be entrusted with the 
decision as to whether to begin discussions with the EU, and any ultimate decision on formal 
application for membership would be decided by national referendum. This at least delayed any 
potential rift between the parties in the short term, without jeopardizing their general co-operation in a 
government that had much work to do on domestic issues. To this end the Government drafted an 
agenda for its first 100 days in office, which echoed the declaration it had made three months earlier 
as an interim government. The agenda included the restructuring of the banking system, dealing with 
foreign claims, instigating democratic reforms and tackling unemployment. At the end of June 2009 a 
potentially significant stability pact was signed by the Government, unions, employers and local 
authorities, covering the next 18 months. In July the Althingi voted in favour of the Government’s 
proposal to apply for membership of the EU by 33 votes to 28 with two abstentions; the IP’s 
amendment in favour of a referendum on the application to the EU, as well as on membership, was 
defeated by 32 votes to 30 with one abstention. The formal application for membership was submitted 
on the following day. 
During its first year in office the new coalition generally contrived to hold together as it struggled to 
deal with the economic disarray and its social and political implications, including an unemployment 
rate of 7%–8%—the highest since official records began in 1991 (although by early 2012 this had 
improved to 5%). However, the political scene soon became dominated by reaction to measures 
concerning the collapse of Icesave, an online savings brand operated by one of Iceland’s three failed 
banks, Landsbanki Íslands. An agreement negotiated with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in 
October 2009, and narrowly ratified by the Althingi in December, bound Iceland to repay the British 
and Dutch Governments in respect of the compensation they had issued to depositors in their 
respective countries; however, in response to public pressure, President Grímsson refused to sign the 
legislation ratifying the agreement and sanctioned a national referendum on the matter, which was 
held on 6 March 2010. This resulted in 93.2% of voters rejecting the proposals, on a turnout of 62.7% 
of the electorate; just 1.8% of voters were in favour, while 5.0% cast blank or invalid ballots. The 
result was interpreted as a protest against the perceived harshness of the terms rather than a denial of 
Iceland’s responsibility or a rejection of the IMF’s conditions for helping Iceland to meet its financial 
obligations. The Icesave crisis resulted in a strong recovery in opinion polls (by as much as 11 
percentage points) for the opposition IP, along with mixed fortunes for the governing coalition 
partners: a broadly maintained level of support for the Left-Green Movement, but a sharp decline for 
the main partner, the SDA. The municipal elections at the end of May 2010 indicated a mood of 
general frustration: a new, satirical political entity, the Best Party (Besti Flokkurinn), founded by a 
comedian, Jón Gnarr, narrowly beat the incumbent IP in Reykjavík, winning over one-third of the 
vote. Gnarr went on to become Mayor of Reykjavík, forming a coalition with the SDA. 
During the Government’s second year of office the divisions between the coalition partners became 
more apparent, and the coalition was also confronted by a partial recovery by the opposition. In 
December 2010 three members of the leftist wing of the Left-Green Movement voted against the 
proposed budget for 2011, resulting in its parliamentary approval by a majority of only one vote. 
Furthermore, in March 2011 two of these three members withdrew their support for the Government 
entirely and decided to serve as independent members of the Althingi (one later announcing a decision 
to form her own party), thereby reducing the Government’s majority to only three. However, these 
divisions did not seem to have fatally dented the Government’s approval rating in public opinion 
polls, which, though lower than that of the IP (which saw a substantial increase), remained fairly 
stable at over one-third. Nor was there a manifest enthusiasm by the populace for an early general 
election, despite controversies such as alleged violation of gender equality laws by the Prime Minister 
herself in connection with an appointment made to her office. 
It was therefore left to the IP, itself not without internal divisions relating to the EU and to the Icesave 
agreement, to threaten and eventually force a vote of no confidence in the Government, which took 
place on 3 April 2011. The Government narrowly survived by a majority of two votes: one member of 
the Left-Green Movement opposed to EU negotiations and conditions imposed by the IMF voted 
against the Government, but this was partly offset by the abstention of one PP member of the 
opposition. Simultaneously defeated by a larger majority was a motion to adjourn the Althingi prior to 
an early general election (otherwise scheduled for April 2013). Meanwhile, there was speculation in 
the press that the Government was seeking to approach a third party to reinforce its potentially 
vulnerable position. 
The motion of no confidence had been largely triggered by the result of a second referendum, held a 
few days earlier, on the Icesave agreement: a version less disadvantageous to Iceland than the 
previous proposal had been approved by the Althingi in February 2011 by 44 votes to 16, and was 
again made subject by the President to a national referendum. This time the vote against was not as 
overwhelming, but the proposal was still rejected by 58.9% on a much increased turnout of 75.3%. 
The matter was therefore referred to the Surveillance Authority of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), prior to the initiation of full legal proceedings by the Governments of the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands.  
Another consequence of the financial crisis was the decision of the parliamentary committee 
examining the official record of the banking collapse. Five of its nine members originally voted to 
summon four former ministers—the former Prime Minister, Haarde, and the ministers formerly 
responsible for foreign affairs, finance and trade—to appear before the Landsdómur, a special court 
established to pass judgment on ministers accused by the Althingi of misconduct in office. Notionally 
comprising six judges, a professor of law and eight members chosen by parliament, the Landsdómur 
had not previously been assembled since its establishment in 1905. In the event, the three ministers 
were saved by the Althingi from the impeachment process, which began in April 2011, and which 
therefore involved only Haarde. The former Prime Minister denied, with some vigour, any personal 
responsibility for the events leading to the crisis in the banking system. In October two of the six 
charges against him were dropped; his trial on the remaining charges took place in April 2012. Three 
of the four charges, including the most serious one involving gross negligence, were dropped, but 
Haarde was found guilty of the lesser charge of failing to hold emergency cabinet meetings at a 
critical stage. However, no punishment was imposed and he was absolved from legal expenses. 
Haarde’s reaction was that the Court had been obliged to find him guilty on one charge if only to save 
face and justify the time and public expense of the whole affair, and that his conscience was clear. 
Haarde remains the only national leader to have faced criminal charges over the financial crisis in the 
interests of public accountability. 
A reorganization of the Cabinet took place in January 2012, resulting in both the removal of the 
Minister of Fisheries and Agriculture, and, for the first time, a majority of female members. However, 
subsequent opinion polls indicated that these changes had not stemmed the decline in support for the 
coalition (which, by mid-2012 was down by one-third since the general election of 2009). Rather than 
the IP, the beneficiaries were two new parties on the left: Bright Future (Björt Framtíd), led by an 
independent member of the Althingi and former PP member, Guđmundur Steingrímsson, which 
formed a collaborative arrangement with the aforementioned Best Party—thus conveniently sharing 
their initials in Icelandic; and Solidarity (Samstađa), assembled by a former member of the Althingi 
from the Left-Green Movement. Polls conducted in the first half of 2012 suggested that these two 
parties were collectively attracting the support of up to 15% of the electorate, with Solidarity 
attracting two-thirds of that support, and in October 2012 the coalition lost its majority. At general 
meetings of the parties in February 2013 the SDA announced that Árni Páll Árnason would take over 
from Jóhanna Sigurđardóttir as leader, and the Left-Green Movement almost unanimously elected 
Katrin Jakobsdóttir as its new leader; meanwhile the IP re-elected Bjarni Benediktsson. In March the 
Government survived by just three votes a motion of no-confidence proposed by a member of the 
Althingi from The Movement. These events had little effect on opinion polls, and it seemed that the 
PP held the strongest hand in the run-up to the 2013 general election, benefiting from its firm stance 
during negotiations on the Icesave dispute and from the ruling of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
that Iceland should pay no penalty to either the United Kingdom nor to the Netherlands, and from PP 
promises of mortgage writedowns. 
The election took place on 27 April 2013. The turnout was 81.2%, the lowest for a parliamentary 
election in the history of the Republic, reflecting a general disillusion with the political and economic 
process in general, notwithstanding a significant improvement in unemployment figures, which by 
then stood at one-half that of the average for the eurozone. In the event it was the IP that emerged as 
the largest single party with 26.7% of votes, though this was its second lowest ever vote, and an 
increase of only 2.8% on its showing in 2009. The PP came second with 24.4%, an increase of 9.6%. 
The combined drop in support for the coalition parties was a massive 57%, with the SDP securing 
12.8% and the Left-Green Movement 10.9% of the total vote. The only two other parties to reach the 
5% threshold for parliamentary representation were Bright Future with 8.2%, and the Pirate Party 
(Píratar), standing for political transparency and internet freedom, established on the Swedish model 
by a former member of the Althingi for The Movement, Birgitta Jónsdóttir, which secured 5.1%. The 
resulting allocation of the 63 seats was 19 each for the IP and PP, nine for the SDA, seven for the 
Left-Green Movement, six for Bright Future and three for the Pirate Party. There were 27 seats now 
held by people new to parliament, and the representation of women in the Althingi was 40%. The 
election also produced Iceland’s youngest ever member of parliament, Jóhanna María Sigmundsdóttir, 
a sheep farmer from the West Fjords, who won a seat for the PP at the age of 21. The only two-party 
arrangement which could therefore achieve the 32 seats necessary for a majority in the Althingi was 
that of the historically well precedented IP/PP. Negotiations lasted for most of the following month, as 
a result of which it was announced that the Chairman of the PP, Sigmundur Davíđ Gunnlaugsson, 
would become Prime Minister, with Bjarni Benediktsson of the IP appointed to the crucial role of 
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. In May the new coalition published its Platform for 
Government under 19 sectoral headings, stating as its prime concerns ‘to improve the situation of 
households in Iceland and to strengthen business and industry with greater value creation for the 
common good’. This was almost immediately followed by two major announcements: firstly that all 
ministries be required to submit proposals for cutbacks of 1.5% of expenditure; and secondly, that the 
new Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade had asked staff temporarily to suspend all work 
on Iceland’s application to join the EU (both parties in the new coalition having long been opposed to 
membership). There is no immediate prospect of a referendum on membership, despite evidence of 
popular support for such a referendum (though not for membership itself). A potential  problem for 
the coalition could be the newly-formed pro-EU party of the centre-right Sjálfstaeđir Evropamenn 
(Independent Europeans), which opened its website for registrations at the start of May 2014, and 
which, according to an initial poll, could attract around 20% of the national vote.  
Th first full year of the new Government’s term has been relatively stable with an undercurrent of 
volatility, characterised by modest improvement in the economic situation and a fall in the 
unemployment rate to 4.5%., but also by continuing controversy surrounding the question of a 
referendum on membership of the EU. In the first official Gallup poll during its term of office (April 
2014) the Government did not fare well, just over half of the respondents declaring satisfaction and 
only a quarter approving- the PM emerged particularly unpopular with a disapproval rating of almost 
two-thirds. Although the coalition does not appear under immediate threat, there was a significant 
warning following the important municipal elections in Reykjavík held on 31
st
 May 2014. This 
resulted in the SDA, led by Dagur B. Eggertsson, topping the poll with 32.6% on a low turnout of 
63%, and although the IP was victorious in other municipalities it was excluded from Reykjavík 
Council along with its national coalition partner the PP, as the SDA was able to form a majority 
coalition with with the LGM, Bright Future and the Pirate Party, with Dagur to be as Mayor of 
Reykjavík. A joint programme was quickly announced, the main featrures being a commitment to 
build 3000 affordable homes under a housing association programme, a reduction in pre-school fees,. 
and a green action plan for the Capital. 
 
Foreign Relations 
Iceland is a member of several international organizations, including the UN, NATO, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council, the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the European Economic Area (EEA). In 2007 
Iceland applied for one of the two seats available on the UN Security Council from 2009 allocated to 
countries from Europe, Australia, New Zealand or Canada, claiming pledges of support from over 
one-half of the member countries of the UN. At the election in October 2008 at the UN General 
Assembly, however, Iceland received only 87 votes, the successful countries being Turkey (151 
votes) and Austria (135). The Government’s position was, with some justification, that the economic 
collapse in Iceland and, possibly, the resulting deterioration in Iceland’s relations with the United 
Kingdom had worked against Iceland’s cause in the last stages of the campaign. However, it 
maintained that the effort had not been wasted in the context of Nordic co-operation. 
Over the years Iceland’s membership of NATO and non-membership of the EU have dominated the 
foreign policy agenda and debate within the country. This is a reflection of the country’s two major 
concerns since independence: national defence and rights over natural resources. 
The defence of Iceland has been virtually underwritten by its somewhat reluctant membership of 
NATO (dating back to NATO’s foundation, in 1949) and to the 1951 agreement with the USA, which 
established the Iceland Defence Force (IDF), based at Keflavík, in the south-west. Over the first three 
decades the arrangement rarely produced a settled political situation, as the traditions of Iceland’s 
cultural and national feeling caused many to oppose a foreign presence on Icelandic soil. The 
dominance of the IP to some extent ensured continued membership, but the unfolding events of the 
Cold War and the differing stances of the other political parties also ensured vocal proponents for 
membership, neutrality, opposition or, indeed, compromise (i.e. continued membership without IDF 
presence). However, during the 1980s a more positive, even active, attitude towards NATO emerged, 
further hastened by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The more recent concern had been that as NATO 
had called for closer ties with the EU, Iceland’s non-membership of the EU might leave it 
marginalized in the context of new developments. Notwithstanding plans to reduce expenditure by 
NATO further, the USA remained committed to maintaining the present level of its forces in Iceland, 
but negotiations continued as the USA reconsidered its international deployment priorities in the 
context of conflict in the Middle East. In 2001–02 Iceland unreservedly affirmed its political support 
for the international action against terrorism and specifically for the US-led military campaign in 
Afghanistan, where the Government has continued to maintain a non-military contribution to NATO’s 
peace-keeping force. Iceland has also had a peace-keeping role in Afghanistan, the Palestinian 
territories and the former Yugoslavia. In the context of the popular uprising in Libya in 2011, Iceland 
declared its support for the establishment of an air exclusion zone; however, the Left-Green 
Movement wing of the coalition, historically inclined towards a non-aligned, pan-Nordic stance, and 
opposed to interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, was firmly opposed to the transfer of command to 
NATO in the UN-authorized action to protect civilians in Libya. 
On 15 March 2006 the USA took Iceland by surprise in declaring that it would be withdrawing the 
majority of its forces from the military base at Keflavík by the end of September. The Icelandic 
Government had already come to realize that it would have to take more responsibility for, and 
financially contribute to, the operation of the base and the international airport, but it had not expected 
such drastic action, nor at such short notice. While it could be argued that the international strategic 
significance of the base had diminished over the previous two decades, the decision would have an 
impact on Iceland’s domestic capability to protect itself, prompting the Government to discuss the 
implications with NATO. The organization approved plans in July 2007 for the patrol and 
surveillance of Icelandic airspace by fighter planes stationed intermittently on Icelandic territory. Also 
of concern were the social and economic consequences if the almost 1,000 Icelandic personnel 
connected with the operation were to lose their jobs. In October 2006, following further negotiations 
between the Icelandic Prime Minister and the US Secretary of State, during which Iceland sought 
certain guarantees for its defence and a co-ordinated transfer of land and operations at the Keflavík 
base, an agreement was reached whereby the USA would continue to provide a more flexible, if 
unspecified, form of support for the security of Iceland and its preparedness for defence. At a regional 
level this new situation stimulated in 2007 an agreement of co-operation with the Norwegian and 
Danish Governments on monitoring maritime security and Icelandic airspace—although an official 
agreement on more comprehensive mutual defence co-operation was not imminent. Iceland also 
signed a consultative agreement on defence co-operation with the United Kingdom in 2008, which 
covered various factors affecting the north Atlantic, and with Canada in October 2010. Such 
agreements with neighbouring countries are considered increasingly important in the context of 
potential rivalries further afield over access to petroleum, natural gas and other resources under the 
Arctic Ocean, along with potential extensions to the Icelandic continental shelf. In June 2010 the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Iceland Defence Agency, with a staff of 50, to oversee 
both internal security and all NATO matters affecting Iceland. 
Iceland’s relations with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom remain uneasy in the wake of 
repayment issues following the Icesave crisis and its obligations to creditors in these two countries. 
By 2012 the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), subsequently backed by the EU, decided to bring 
the case against Iceland to the Court of EFTA. Public referendums and the stance of all Iceland’s 
political parties have demonstrated opposition to the ESA’s action, and—notwithstanding some 
preliminary repayments of principal from the assets of the new Landsbanki—in the event the ESA 
ruled that Iceland need pay no penalty to either government; however, this fraught episode may 
continue to affect Iceland’s relations with the EU as a whole. A more constructive development in 
Iceland’s relations with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands is the proposal to exploit its 
abundance of natural energy by constructing an undersea cable measuring 1,500 km to transmit power 
to those countries, thus benefiting both the Icelandic economy and the demand for electricity at the 
other end. Preliminary discussions began in May 2012. Iceland’s official relations with Europe started 
with its membership of EFTA in 1970, followed two years later by a free trade agreement with the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Further measures at that time were precluded by Iceland’s 
economic dependence on control over its fishing rights, partly for reasons of conservation of stocks, 
but mainly to protect the country’s most essential natural resource from foreign exploitation; between 
1958 and 1975 Iceland had unilaterally extended its fishing limits, progressively, from four to 200 
nautical miles, resulting in three separate armed disputes with the United Kingdom, echoed in the 
mid-1990s by further disputes with Norway and Denmark. 
Following negotiations between the countries of EFTA and the European Communities (EC, of which 
the EEC was part, and which became the EU in 1993), the EEA was established in 1991, effectively 
bringing Iceland into many areas of the single market, and producing an agreement whereby Iceland 
would enjoy access to EC markets free of tariff for most of its marine exports and also partial access 
to EC waters in return for a quota of catch by EC fishing vessels. Furthermore, in order to retain the 
freedom of movement that Iceland had long enjoyed with the other Nordic countries, Iceland became, 
in 1998, an associate member of the Schengen Agreement on open borders, which became part of the 
EU’s jurisdiction. Iceland officially joined the Schengen Agreement in March 2001. Iceland’s foreign 
policy stance, therefore, reflected its dilemma about how to keep open the door to eventual full 
membership of the EU by co-operating on several fronts, while being acutely aware that such 
membership was precluded by the common fisheries policy of the EU—which would be likely to 
entail sacrifice of Iceland’s sovereignty over fishing rights, as well as undermining Icelandic 
agricultural policies, with severe economic consequences. More than a decade later these remain 
significant hurdles. 
With the onset of the crisis in the Icelandic banking system and the plummeting of the Icelandic króna 
from September 2008, public opinion veered towards support for pursuing membership of the EU. 
However, by 2012, three years after the newly elected Althingi’s decision to apply for membership 
(notwithstanding differences in the stances of the two coalition partners—the SDA being generally in 
favour and the Left-Green Movement against), opinion polls indicated that up to 57% of the electorate 
was in favour of withdrawing the application. In the mean time the EU had agreed to start 
negotiations with Iceland, stating that, despite ‘structural weaknesses’, Iceland fulfilled the necessary 
preconditions. Preliminary processes continued with a view to commencing formal negotiations 
leading to a potential referendum on the outcome; however, one of the first acts of the new 
government in May 2013 was to suspend all work on Iceland’s application. This suspension still 
applies, and the Prime Minister’s stance is that, although a referendum is not completely ruled out for 
the future, there is little point in a government who does not support membership pursuing 
negotiations on potential accession. In March 2014 the Government issued its European policy 
document in which  the emphasis was on enhancing collaboration within the EEA and the Nordic 
Union with further action plans, whilst also being willing to be involved in certain legislative 
processes of the EU. 
Meanwhile on 1
st
 July Iceland broadened its horizons by becoming the first country in Europe to 
negotiate a free trade agreement with China  
A further example of Iceland’s vulnerability in an increasingly globalized world relates to its stance 
on whaling, over which Iceland, along with Norway and Japan, has been in dispute with the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) for a quarter of a century. Iceland, for whom whaling 
forms a disproportionate percentage of economic activity, resigned from the IWC in 1992, following 
the Commission’s ban on whaling for commercial purposes. In 2009 Iceland was invited, somewhat 
surprisingly, to join the IWC task force with a view to establishing reconciliation between opposing 
groups. The annual meeting of the IWC in 2010 attempted to reconcile the commercial, scientific, and 
environmental arguments for and against whaling in the context of sustainability; accordingly, it 
issued a proposal to permit Iceland (whose current policy was in any case to continue whaling until at 
least 2013) to continue its activity, but only according to an annual quota set by the IWC. There were 
subsequently allegations that Iceland was breaching its quotas. Iceland’s current quota for fin whales 
is 180, It recently suspended its policy of harpooning the endangered fin whale,and although one of 
the last acts of the previous coalition was to issue a regulation extending one of the protected reserves 
for whales, the new government immediately revoked it. Finwhaling resumed in June 2014, and as a 
consequence the United States delivered a snub by not inviting Iceland to its international Our Ocean 
conference. The conflict between one of Iceland’s traditional activities and the majority of 
international opinion remains largely unresolved. 
Iceland’s foreign relations, therefore, illustrate that the balance between dependence, independence 
and interdependence remains very fine for the small nation state that is Iceland. 
‘Make the place where you belong your stronghold is my advice to small and large alike—at least 
until we know what is large and what small in this world’. Halldór Laxness (Icelandic author and 
Nobel Prizewinner for Literature). 
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